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THE GLOBAL COURT: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF COMMERCIAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 
Charles N. Brower* 
I begin with first principles: The story of the twentieth century 
is that of the dilution, the dissipation, and, in' some areas, the vir-
tual disappearance of state power. Due in varying parts to the ad-
vance of technology, principally communications technology, to per-
vasive abuses of state power, and to various tendencies to anarchy, 
this shift in the locus of authority arises in significant part from a 
widespread popular realization that the collective public responsibil-
ity of the state cannot successfully substitute on a broad basis for in-
dividual responsibility privately exercised. 
To be sure, there are exceptions. Notably in Europe, the au-
thority of states has given way in important measure, not to the pri-
vate sector, but instead to the supranational sway of European polit-
ical institutions wielding public authoiity. By and large, however, 
privatization abounds: Formerly nationally-owned entities, including 
even gas and electricity providers as well as airlines, become pri-
vatelyowned; army cooks frequently no longer are military person-
nel, but instead are contracted from industrial food service suppli-
ers; even jails are operated by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. 
Behind all of this there stands, nonetheless, and there must re-
main, however residually, the ultimate behavior-enforcing authority 
of the state. The "private versus public" debate always has been over 
the relative allocation of authority between the two; the complete 
elimination of state regulatory prerogatives would be at least as dis-
astrous as was the attempted eradication of private property in the 
late, unlamented socialist economies. But - and this is the n~b of 
it - the relative reduction in the role of states today necessarily 
means also internationalization, or globalization. 
* President, American Society of International Law; Partner, White & Case, 
Washington, D.C. BA, 1957, Harvard University; J.D., 1961, Harvard Univer-
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George Washington University International Law Forum in Potsdam, Gennany 
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9 
10 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the means by which legal 
disputes involving international commerce and foreign investment 
increasingly are adjudicated outside of any national system of 
courts, even where they directly involve states as parties. I am speak-
ing, of course, of the growth in private international arbitration of 
such disputes that formerly were heard in national courts. Specifi-
cally, I refer to that system whereby parties of different nationalities 
agree to mandatory and binding arbitration of disputes that may 
arise, or have arisen, between them, pursuant to a particular set of 
arbitration rules, usually before a panel composed of three indepen-
dent and impartial persons of different nationalities, who also come 
from disparate legal traditions and whom the parties themselves 
have selected. 
The growth of such privatized adjudication has been nothing 
less than explosive. For many years the International Chamber of 
Commerce International Court of Arbitration, established in Paris 
in 1923, held the. field" alone; it was the only serious player. It took 
fifty-three years for it to receive its first 3,000 cases; the next 3,000, 
however, came in just eleven years} In more recent times other in-
stitutions have sprung up alongside it like wild flowers proliferating 
in a summer meadow: The London Court of International Arbitra-
tion and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, for ex-
ample, as well as various other regional, national, provincial, and 
even sector counterparts. In 1976 the United Nations General As-
sembly itself entered the field with its promulgation of the Arbitra-
tion Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The founding of the International Federa-
tion of Commercial Arbitration Institutions in 1985 with seventy 
charter members itself confirmed this growth; its expansion subse-
quently to embrace ninety members has reconfirmed it. All of these 
systems are available to disputants worldwide, and, despite the dif-
ferences in them, are fundamentally the same. 
As already suggested, this growth in private adjudication is 
matched stride for stride, indeed it is made possible by the concom-
itant convergence of relevant national laws and the elaboration of 
facilitative international agreements, resulting in the international-
ization of adjudicated commercial dispute resolution. 
1. See w. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRA· 
T10N 4 (ICC Publ'g 1990). 
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Any arbitration necessarily is subject to the national law of the 
state in which it takes place. Statutes in major industrial jurisdic-
tions have been modernized so as to minimize state intervention in 
the arbitral process itself, while offering judicial review to the extent 
necessary to ensure the integrity of the process by which the arbitral 
tribunal arrived at its award. To the same end UNCITRAL in 1985 
fashioned a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
designed to provide an "off the shelf" statute for adoption by less 
sophisticated jurisdictions and to encourage greater convergence, if 
not uniformity, on the part of others. It has been adopted, albeit 
with variations, in a considerable number of jurisdictions. 
At the same time, the international community has adopted a 
series of conventions and treaties ensuring mutual and uniform en-
forcement of agreements to arbitrate, and also of the resulting 
awards, of which the New York Convention of 1958 is the most 
prominent. In 1965 the World Bank went so far as to establish, pur-
suant to convention, the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID), and with it, a completely self-contained 
regime for deciding investment disputes. So effective are these sys-
tems that today an international arbitral award is worth far more 
than a judgment of a national court abroad; the former is subject to 
comparatively automatic enforcement, whereas the latter mUst be 
made the subject of a plenary suit. 
This three-tiered and essentially global system, consisting of pri-
vate adjudication under agreed rules, supported by only the most 
limited national regulation necessary to ensure its integrity, and an 
international exercise of state power to the extent required to guar-
antee enforcement of the results, is based on the parties' reciprocal 
mistrust of state power. This mistrust takes a special form, however. 
It is not mistrust of state power per se; rather it is the lack of faith 
on the part of each party that the courts of the other party's state 
of nationality in fact will administer justice fairly and impartially. In 
short, neither party wishes to be judged in the other's "backyard." 
In addition, relative detachment of the process from state power fa-
cilitates a degree of internationalization, and consequent uniform-
ity, which has its own merits for international commerce, but which 
otherwise would be unattainable. 
This trend goes much deeper, however, than the adjudicatory 
process itself; it goes also to the heart of the matter, the applicable 
substantive law. Just as trading partners who are foreign to each 
other eschew each other's courts, so, too, do they prefer not to be 
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judged by each other's national legal norms. This concern is high-
est, of course, where one of the parties is itself a state or a peristal-
tic enterprise. In such circumstances the parties, with increasing fre-
quency, will concoct for themselves a jurisprudential corpus that 
either is divorced from any national system of law or combines a 
relevant national legal system with another body of law to supple-
ment or modify it and which any national court system would have 
considerable difficulty to apply. For example, under the 1955 Libyan 
Petroleum Law, the law applicable to oil concession agreements in 
that country (some of which still are in effect), it is provided that 
the applicable law is "the law[] of Libya and such rules and princi-
ples of international law as may be relevant but only to the extent 
that such' rules and principles are not inconsistent with and do not 
conflict with the laws of Libya."2 Another example is Article 42(1) 
of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), . 
which provides that in the absence of any other agreement on the 
matter "the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and 
such rules of international law as may be applicable."3 Another fa-
vorite source is the lex mercatoria, a concept reflected, inter alia, in 
Article 13(5) of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce, providing that "[i]n all cases 
the arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of the contract 
and the relevant trade usages." In 1994 the International Institute 
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) promulgated Prin-
ciples of International Commercial Contracts,4 a compendium of 
principles derived from both the civil law and common law tradi-
tions, which a 1997 report of UNIDROIT on their implementation 
confirms now are frequently adopted by name as the governing law 
in contracts. Finally, Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of 
America establishing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which 
has adjudicated hundreds of commercial claims of American busi-
nesses and individuals against Iranian entities, provides as follows: 
2. Robert B. Von Mehren 8c P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations Between 
States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan NationaJ.iuJtiIm Cases, 75 AM. J INT'L 
L 477, 482 n.22 (1981). 
3. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,575 V.N.T.S. 159. 
4. INTERNATIONAL 1NSITI1JTE FOR THE UNIFlCATION OF PRIvATE LAw. PluNOPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CoMMEROAL CoNTRACTS (1994). 
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The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect 
for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of 
commercial and international law as the Tribunal deter-
mines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages 
of the trade, contract provisions and changed 
circumstances. S 
13 
The fact that this "global court" works, and works well, is 
proven by its consistent triumph over adversity. Numerous arbitra-
tions against foreign parties, including pariah governments such as, 
in recent years, Libya, have proceeded to a conclusion, with pay-
ment being achieved, notwithstanding the most determined efforts 
of some defendants to disrupt, or even to abort, the proceedings. 
Tactics to this end have included failure to appoint an arbitrator, or 
appointment of a patently biased arbitrator; refusal to appear, or al-
ternating sporadic appearances with demonstrative "walkouts" and 
other intentional absences; unwarranted objections to jurisdiction; 
unjustified challenges to the service of particular arbitrators, or 
even attempts to intimidate them; and all manner of lesser forms of 
abuse of the process. In one famous case at the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal two Iranian judges even assaulted an elderly Swed-
ish colleague. In the end, none of these tactics succeeds, however, 
because all modem sets of arbitral rules provide the means for de-
molishing or overlooking such obstacles and are backed, as noted a 
moment ago, by indispensable attachment to state power. 
In conclusion, let me say that based on my by now rather con-
siderable experience in this "global court," as counsel both for pri-
vate parties and for states, for defendants as well as claimants, and 
as arbitrator and judge, I firmly believe that by and large the results 
that it achieves are as just as are those experienced in the preferred 
national court systems of highly developed jurisdictions. Moreover, 
for those privileged to participate in its proceedings it is indeed 
highly enjoyable and rewarding. 
5. See DEClARATION OF THE GoVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POP1JLo\R REPus. 
UC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SE1TLEMENI' OF CLAIMs BY THE GoVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GoVERNMENT OF THE IsLAMIC REPUBUC 
OF IRAN Gan. 19, 1981), rqninted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 9-12. 
